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What Lessons for Economic Development 





The medieval Champagne fairs are widely used to draw lessons about the institutional basis 
for long-distance impersonal exchange. This paper re-examines the causes of the outstanding 
success of the Champagne fairs in mediating international trade, the timing and causes of the 
fairs’ decline, and the institutions for securing property rights and enforcing contracts at the 
fairs. It finds that contract enforcement at the fairs did not take the form of private-order or 
corporative mechanisms, but was provided by public institutions. More generally, the success 
and decline of the Champagne fairs depended crucially on the policies adopted by the public 
authorities. 
JEL-Code: N430, N730, O170. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Champagne fairs were a cycle of periodic trade fairs held annually from the 
twelfth century onwards. They took place six times a year and rotated among four 
towns – Bar-sur-Aube, Lagny, Provins and Troyes – located in the county of 
Champagne, a polity enjoying extensive internal autonomy until its incorporation into 
France in 1285. Each fair lasted for about six weeks, followed by a break for 
merchants to move on to the next fair, so the Champagne fair-cycle constituted an 
almost continuous market throughout the year, a notable advantage over most other 
medieval fairs.
1 Although merchants from many countries traded many goods at the 
Champagne fairs, the core business was the exchange of cloth and wool brought by 
Flemish and French traders for spices and luxuries brought by Italian and Provençal 
merchants. The Italian presence also fostered financial sophistication, and the fairs 
increasingly attracted international payment and exchange services. The Champagne 
fairs operated as the undisputed fulcrum of international exchange in Europe for much 
of the thirteenth century. 
 
Their early success and international importance have made the Champagne fairs a 
standard-bearer of the medieval Commercial Revolution, from which many scholars 
draw lessons about the institutional basis for impersonal exchange and long-distance 
trade. Historians view the Champagne fairs as central to debates about the factors 
influencing commercial growth in medieval Europe.
2 Economists draw lessons from 
the medieval Champagne fairs for modern developing economies, some using them to 
urge the merits of private-order contract-enforcement and the unimportance of public 
legal mechanisms,
3 while others claim that the fairs show that collective reprisals 
among corporative communities of businessmen can sustain impersonal exchange.
4  
 
The Champagne fairs thus play a central role in the analysis of the institutional 
foundations of market-based economic activity. So it is important to establish what the 
evidence shows about the causes of their success. The only full-length studies of the 
                                                 
1 Bautier (1953), 113. 
2 Alengry (1915), 13-17, 72-84; Bautier (1953), 143-4; Bloch (1964), 86-7; Braudel (1979), 3:93; 
Braudel (1981), 419; Chapin (1937), 13; De Roover (1948), 11-12; Laurent (1935); Munro (2001), 14-
16; Pirenne (1936), 100-03.  
3 Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990). 
4 Greif (2006a), 100, 315, 317, 333, 336.   2 
fairs were carried out in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
5 and even the 
most recent empirical accounts date back to the 1970s.
6 The time is thus ripe for a 
renewed examination of the historical evidence on these fairs and a critical assessment 
of any lessons they might hold for economic development.  
 
2. The Ascendancy of the Fairs and ‘Generalized’ Institutional Provision 
 
What explains the outstanding success of the Champagne fairs in attracting and 
mediating international trade in the medieval Commercial Revolution? Champagne 
had periodic fairs from at least the early twelfth century, although initially they 
enjoyed no international importance. Between 1137 and 1164, merchants from 
Flanders, Arras, and many parts of the kingdom of France began to attend fairs in 
Champagne, and by 1174 they had been joined by Italians.
7 By 1190 Italian merchants 
were visiting Champagne in significant numbers and the annual cycle of six fairs was 
well established.
8 On this basis, the beginning of the Champagne fairs’ European 
preeminence is usually taken to be about 1180. During the first half of the thirteenth 
century the volume and sophistication of business at the fairs increased as 
international merchants attended in ever greater numbers. At least until c. 1260, 
scholars are universally agreed that the Champagne fairs were in their ascendancy, 
both as an emporium for the trade in wares and as the ‘money-market of Europe’. 
How can this ascendancy be explained? 
 
The policies of the counts of Champagne played a major role in the rise of the fairs. 
The counts had an interest in ensuring the success of the fairs, which brought in very 
significant revenues.
9 These revenues in turn enabled the counts to consolidate their 
political position by rewarding allies and attracting powerful vassals.
10 As a result, the 
counts were willing to provide various institutional mechanisms needed for the 
                                                 
5 Notably Bourquelot (1865); Huvelin (1897); Bassermann (1911); Laurent (1935); Chapin (1937). 
6 New findings are presented in Bautier (1953), of which Bautier (1970) is a curtailed translation; 
Thomas (1977) presents new evidence on the declining, fourteenth-century fairs. Surveys based on 
secondary literature are provided by Verlinden (1965), 126-34; Schönfelder (1988); and Knights (1992).  
7 Bautier (1953), 110-11; Laurent (1935), 49-50, 84-5, 96, 100-01. 
8 Reynolds (1931), 380; Face (1957); Bautier (1953), 115; Laurent (1935), 86. 
9 Bassermann (1911), 3; Bourquelot (1865), II:175-206. 
10 Alengry (1915), 50-1. For examples, see Evergates (2010), 166, 169, 219-26, 237-8, 242-3, 250, 286.   3 
successful operation of an international fair, and were able to avoid selling privileges 
to special interest-groups that would have limited trade.
11 
 
The first institutional service provided by the counts of Champagne consisted of 
mechanisms for ensuring security of the persons and property rights of traders. The 
counts undertook early, focused and comprehensive action to ensure the safety of 
merchants travelling to and from the fairs, and were unusual among medieval fair-
authorities in devoting considerable political and military resources to extending this 
guarantee beyond their territorial boundaries.
12 As early as 1148, when 
moneychangers from Vézelay were robbed on their way to the Provins fair by a 
French nobleman, Count Thibault II wrote to the regent of France demanding that the 
moneychangers be compensated and declaring, ‘I will not let take place with impunity 
such an injury, which tends to nothing less than the ruin of my fairs’.
13 In 1149, when 
another French nobleman seized the goods of merchants travelling to the Champagne 
fairs, the count wrote again to the French regent demanding justice, saying ‘if you 
wish to chastise him and march against him with an army, let me know: I will assist 
you in extracting vengeance from him’.
14 By the early thirteenth century, the counts 
were negotiating formal treaties from neighbouring princes to guarantee safe conduct 
to visitors to ‘their’ fairs – in 1209 with France, in 1220 with Burgundy, and in 1232 
with Boulogne.
15 Before mid-century, the counts were extending the geographical 
scope of the safe conduct as far afield as Italy. In 1242-3, when some Italian 
merchants travelling to the Champagne fairs were kidnapped and robbed in Italy by 
Piacenzans, the count of Champagne wrote to the Piacenzan authorities threatening to 
ban all Piacenzan merchants from his fairs unless the victims were compensated.
16 As 
early as the 1170s, the counts had begun appointing special ‘fair-wardens’ with 
policing, regulatory and jurisdictional powers at the fairs, and by the mid-thirteenth 
century they had empowered these wardens to exert pressure on foreign jurisdictions 
to enforce the safe conduct of the fairs.
17 In 1283-5, for instance, when a Artois toll-
                                                 
11 Chapin (1937). 
12 Bautier (1953), 117-18; Laurent (1935), 258-9. 
13 Bourquelot (1865), I:32 324-5; Goldschmidt (1891), 229 n. 153. 
14 Bourquelot (1865), I:324-5; Arbois de Jubainville and Pigeotte (1859-66), II:388. 
15 Bourquelot (1865), I:174. See Evergates (2010), 47-51 (#18-22) for instances of enforcement dating 
from 1217. 
16 Bourquelot (1865), I, 178-9. 
17 Bourquelot (1865), I:180; Laurent (1935), 259, 295-7, 303-04.   4 
keeper violated the safe conduct by imprisoning an Ypres merchant travelling to the 
Champagne fairs, the count’s fair-wardens threatened to exclude all citizens of Artois 
from future fairs in retribution.
18 
 
The counts of Champagne also ensured that merchants were secure at the fairs 
themselves, enforcing property rights through their own law-courts (as we shall see), 
employing their own officials to police the streets, and cooperating with municipal and 
ecclesiastical officials to guarantee security in the fair-towns.
19 Alengry argues that the 
creation by the 1170s of dedicated fair-wardens made an important contribution to the 
ascendancy of the fairs ‘because the wardens were independent of the tyrannies and 
subjections of the local prévôté, since they depended solely on the sovereign’.
20 
 
A second institutional service provided by the rulers of Champagne was contract-
enforcement. The counts of Champagne operated a four-tiered system of public law-
courts which judged lawsuits and officially witnessed contracts with a view to 
subsequent enforcement. The highest princely court in Champagne was the Jours de 
Troyes, a tribunal which judged important cases as a court of first instance and also 
heard appeals from lower courts. The second tier of the princely justice-system 
consisted of the courts of the four baillis (bailiffs) which judged cases involving high-
status parties such as nobles, religious houses, and foreign merchants. The third tier 
consisted of the courts of the prévôts (provosts), numbering 54 in 1285, who as 
representatives of the prince rendered justice to commoners. The lowest tier of the 
princely justice-system consisted of village courts operated by maires (mayors), 
officials appointed by the prévôt to render justice to the inhabitants of each village. 
Towns, in contrast to villages, were subject to the direct jurisdiction of the local bailli 
or prévôt, unless they managed to obtain commune privileges. These entitled a town to 
have a mayor and 12 échevins (aldermen), appointed by the prince, with jurisdiction 
over cases involving urban inhabitants although also open to outsiders. After 
Champagne became part of France in 1285, the French crown retained this four-tiered 
                                                 
18 Laurent (1935), 295, 303-04. 
19 Bourquelot (1839-40), I:119; Bourquelot (1865), II:20, 219-20; Laurent (1935), 279-80; Terrasse 
(2005), 228-32. 
20 Alengry (1915), 108.   5 




Cases involving foreign merchants could be adjudicated at most levels of this public 
legal system. For the most serious cases, according to Alengry, ‘the count as sovereign 
was directly employed in person in ensuring justice was rendered to visitors to the 
fairs who had suffered injury’.
22 This long-standing princely provision of justice to 
visiting merchants, dating back to the twelfth century, was explicitly confirmed and 
extended in 1245 when the count granted Roman, Tuscan, Lombard and Provençal 
merchants frequenting the St Ayoul fair in Provins the privilege of being subject solely 




Less serious conflicts involving merchants at the fairs were judged by the princely 
bailli or prévôt.
24 At each fair a temporary wooden lodge was erected, from which the 
prévôt dispensed civil and criminal justice.
25 The first record of this lodge dates from 
1176, when count Henri assigned to the churchwardens of St Quiriace ‘the wood from 
the lodges of the prévôts at the fairs’.
26 Further detail is provided by the Provins 
communal charter of 1252, which alluded to the lodges of the prévôts at the fairs and 
declared that ‘the merchants who come to the fairs shall be judged by us [the count] 
and our people: that is, by the fair-wardens, or by the bailli, or by a person whom he 
shall set in his place’.
27 A subsequent Provins charter of 1268 also mentions the lodges 
of the prévôts at the fairs, and confirms that ‘foreign merchants and our Jews shall 
remain within our protection and in our justice’.
28 A 1324 conflict between the royal 
prévôt and the abbot of Lagny over the fair jurisdiction confirmed the continued 
jurisdiction of the princely prévôt at the Champagne fairs into the fourteenth century.
29 
 
                                                 
21 Arbois de Jubainville and Pigeotte (1859-66), III:155-70; Arbois de Jubainville (1859), 4-17; 
Bourquelot (1839-40), I:210; Benton (1969), 281-3. 
22 Alengry (1915), 110. 
23 Bourquelot (1865), 174. 
24 Arbois de Jubainville (1859), 22. 
25 Alengry (1915), 113; Terrasse (2005), 61, 78. 
26 Bourquelot (1865), II:20 n. 1; Arbois de Jubainville and Pigeotte (1859-66), III:235. 
27 Bourquelot (1839-40), II:409; Terrasse (2005), 45, 61. 
28 Bourquelot (1839-40), II:416; Terrasse (2005), 61, 78. 
29 Boutaric (1867), II:551 (#7394).   6 
By the 1170s, as mentioned above, the counts of Champagne had supplemented 
ordinary public legal provision at the fairs by appointing special officials called fair-
wardens (gardes des foires).
30 They were first recorded in 1174, when they were 
required to proclaim a regulation about weights and measures at the start of each fair.
31 
By the 1220s at latest, the fair-wardens were operating a continual court throughout 
the duration of each fair, at which merchants could register commercial contracts and 
unpaid creditors could bring complaints. The first recorded case of a merchant contract 
being witnessed by the fair-wardens dates from 1225, at which point the wardens were 
still using their own personal seals.
32 At some periods, as in Provins in 1228, the same 
man was both fair-warden and princely bailli, and it is unclear in which capacity he 
was judging which cases.
33 By 1247, the fair-wardens were witnessing merchant 
contracts using an official fair seal.
34 In 1252, the fair-wardens were operating 
alongside the princely baillis in dispensing justice to foreign merchants at the Provins 
fairs.
35 Bautier argues that until c. 1260, the wardens’ jurisdictional purview was still 
limited, since merchant contracts more frequently bore ecclesiastical than fair-
wardens’ seals.
36 However, merchants did not record all debts at the fairs using sealed 
contracts. Many sales, particularly of cloth, were made on short-term credit, which 
was recorded by money-changers or notaries, or simply agreed before witnesses.
37 
Defaults on such debts could be referred to the fair-wardens even when the original 
contracts had not been sealed by the wardens.
38 By the 1260s, the fair-wardens 
possessed powers of confiscation, fining, and incarceration, and by the 1270s were 
declaring their mandate to ensure everywhere the fulfillment of any contract issued at 
the fairs, ‘in the name of the count of Champagne’.
39 
 
But public alternatives to the princely court system did exist, and this was another 
strength of contract enforcement at the Champagne fairs, since jurisdictional 
competition created incentives for courts to provide impartial judgments. For one 
                                                 
30 Goldschmidt (1891), 229-30. 
31 Arbois de Jubainville and Pigeotte (1859-66), III:235-6, 367; Bautier (1953), 118. 
32 Bautier (1953), 118-19. 
33 Chapin (1937), 126. 
34 Bautier (1953), 118-19. 
35 Bourquelot (1839-40), II:409. 
36 Bautier (1953), 119, 122-3. 
37 Bautier (1953), 119-20. 
38 Bassermann (1911), 26-9. 
39 Bautier (1952), 320.   7 
thing, three of the Champagne fair-towns (Provins, Bar-sur-Aube, and Troyes) had 
privileges as communes entitling them to operate municipal mayoral courts during this 
period.
40 Sometimes, as in Troyes in 1231 or Provins in 1270-9, the same man was 
both town mayor and princely fair-warden, and it is difficult to distinguish in which 
capacity he exercised jurisdiction in particular cases.
41 The Provins charter of 1252 
stated that merchants at the fairs were to be judged by the count and his officials, but 
left foreign traders the option of using municipal courts: ‘and if it pleases them to seek 
law in front of the mayor, the mayors have the liberty and power to do so ... and the 
fines from the foreign merchants shall go to the commune up to 20 sols, and the 
surplus shall be ours’. In apparent recognition of this joint jurisdiction, the 1252 
charter stated that ‘the mayors and commune shall have, at the fairs of Provins, their 
lodge on the pavement alongside that of the prévôt’.
42 The 1268 Provins charter also 
stated firmly that foreign merchants were under princely jurisdiction, but also gave 
them the option of bringing cases to the municipal jurisdiction, and confirmed that the 
lodge of the mayoral court at the fairs should be located beside that of the prévôt.
43  
 
How effective were municipal courts in providing the impartial contract-enforcement 
necessary for international trade? The strongest evidence for their effectiveness is that 
long-distance merchants chose to use them. According to both Bourquelot and Bautier, 
municipal courts in Champagne did judge lawsuits at the fairs, and foreign merchants 
at the fairs sometimes voluntarily chose to use them even though princely courts were 
available.
44 In 1278, for instance, a Florentine merchant appeared before the Provins 
mayoral court declaring that he and his associates had received payment on a fair-
debt.
45 Visiting merchants evidently used the municipal courts sufficiently often to 
increase their caseload since, as Bourquelot discovered, the Provins town accounts 
‘abound in details concerning expenditures of the commune on the occasion of the 
fairs’, including the costs of carrying benches into the mayor’s judicial lodge.
46 
Further evidence of the attractiveness of municipal courts to foreign merchants is 
                                                 
40 In Bar-sur-Aube, c.1179-c.1260; in Provins, 1230-1335; in Troyes, 1230-1242. See Bourquelot 
(1865), II:19-20; Bautier (1952), 318-19; Arbois de Jubainville (1859), 18-30; Tardif (1855); Terrasse 
(2005), 45, 57, 61-3, 69-70, 77-9, 164, 215, 219, 232. 
41 Chapin (1937), 126-33. 
42 Bourquelot (1839-40), II:409. 
43 Bourquelot (1839-40), II:416. 
44 Bourquelot (1839-40), I:210; Bourquelot (1865), II:19-20; Bautier (1952), 318-19. 
45 Davidsohn (1896-1901), 30. 
46 Bourquelot (1865), II:20.   8 
provided by repeated jurisdictional rivalries between town courts and the princely 
prévots and fair-wardens, some serious enough to come to the Grand Jours de 
Troyes.
47 The mayoral courts held frequent sittings – sometimes as many as 46 
sessions annually – and had strong incentives to offer attractive judicial services to 




The church provided an additional set of public law-courts offering contract 
enforcement to merchants at the fairs.
49 A charter of 1153 granted the Priory of St 
Ayoul high and low justice over the entire town and lordship of Provins for the first 
seven days of the annual autumn fair, suspending all other jurisdictions (both princely 
and municipal), and ordering the counts’ officials to swear obedience to the priory 
during the seven days of its fair-jurisdiction.
50 The priory’s tribunal, manned by a 
bailiff, his deputy, a public prosecutor, and a clerk of the court, held daily sittings in a 
chamber in the monastery buildings and was known for the swiftness of its judgments 
and the modesty of its fees. Superficially, this jurisdiction might seem unimportant, 
since it lasted only a week and excluded the fair’s core sales period. But the 
commercial and judicial activities of the Champagne fairs operated continuously 
throughout the year, so the priory’s tribunal could judge any business left over from 
previous fairs.
51 Certainly, the priory’s tribunal was popular among merchants and 
enjoyed such a volume of business that it customarily prolonged its sittings up to 
midnight on the final day of its jurisdiction, before the princely jurisdiction took over 
the next morning. The priory’s jurisdiction at the Provins autumn fair was repeatedly 
confirmed by rulers of Champagne over the centuries.
52 
 
A second ecclesiastical tribunal was provided by the abbey of St Pierre, which 
exercised jurisdiction during the three days of cloth-selling at the Lagny fairs held 
each January.
53 During these three days, the abbots’ bailiff judged all conflicts 
                                                 
47 Arbois de Jubainville and Pigeotte (1859-66), VI:104; Bourquelot (1865), I:210, II:196; Terrasse 
(2005), 45, 57, 61-3, 69-70, 77-9, 164, 192, 215, 219, 232. 
48 Terrasse (2005), 70, 211, 227. 
49 Goldschmidt (1891), 229-30; Bassermann (1911), 4-5; Davidsohn (1896-1901), 8-9; Bautier (1953), 
123-4; Terrasse (2005), 78. 
50 Bourquelot (1839-40), I:117-19, 210, 408; Alengry (1915), 114. 
51 Bautier (1953), 113. 
52 Bourquelot (1839-40), I:117-19; Alengry (1915), 114. 
53 Bourquelot (1865), II:24-5; Alengry (1915), 113.   9 
(including criminal ones) without right of appeal, so long as they were not reserved for 
the princely fair-wardens.
54 This church jurisdiction was of central importance, since 
the core business of each fair was conducted on its cloth-trading days. The abbey 
regarded its fair-jurisdiction as extremely important, conserved it jealously, and 
repeatedly engaged in jurisdictional conflicts with the princely prévôt.
55  
 
Security and contract-enforcement may have been the most important institutional 
services provided by the counts of Champagne – or devolved to municipal or 
ecclesiastical institutions – to support the fairs. But they were not the only ones. The 
counts also provided infrastructure, loan guarantees, and constraints on local 
merchants’ privileges, all of which contributed to the fairs’ success.  
 
The counts made major contributions, both directly and indirectly, to commercial 
infrastructure for merchants visiting the fairs. The counts erected fortifications around 
the fair towns and roads connecting them, and built canals from the Seine into the fair-
town of Troyes.
56 The Hôtel-Dieu was founded in Provins around 1157-60 by the 
count to expand accommodation for visiting merchants.
57 By granting concessions on 
market dues, the counts mobilized other organizations, especially ecclesiastical ones, 
to provide infrastructure for merchants in the form of accommodation, warehousing, 
and selling space.
58 The counts also encouraged investment in fair infrastructure, 
Terrasse argues, by granting burghers free rights to transact in real property, as shown 




The counts further facilitated the development of the fairs as money markets by 
guaranteeing the security of loans merchants made at the fairs to creditors from whom 
obtaining payment might be difficult because of high status or privileged legal 
position. In 1221, for instance, the countess of Flanders and Hainaut borrowed a large 
sum at the Champagne fairs, and a condition of the loan was that the count of 
Champagne would ban Flemish and Hainaut merchants from his fairs if the countess 
                                                 
54 Bourquelot (1865), II:24-5. 
55 Boutaric (1867), II:440 (#6764), 551 (#7394). 
56 Bourquelot (1865), I:62, 311; Bautier (1953), 108-12; Alengry (1915), 54. 
57 Bautier (1953), 112. 
58 Bautier (1953), 116. 
59 Terrasse (2005), 23-5.   10 
of Flanders failed to repay.
60 In 1224-5, a group of Sienese merchants at the 
Champagne fairs refused to lend 3000 livres to an abbey without a guarantee from the 
count.
61 The period between 1210 and 1250 saw numerous loans issued at the 
Champagne fairs by foreign merchants to princes, nobles and religious houses in 
which the count of Champagne used his political power to guarantee repayment.
62 
 
A final reason for the success of the Champagne fair-cycle was that it offered an 
almost continuous market for merchandise and financial services throughout the year, 
like a great trading city, but without the most severe disadvantage of medieval cities – 
special privileges for locals that discriminated against foreign merchants.
63 As Alengry 
points out, had the Champagne fair-towns had strong communal privileges favouring a 
local patriciate of rich commercial families, ‘the clientele of the Champagne fairs 
would certainly not have benefited: the comital authorities were independent because 
they were disinterested from any business rivalry, by contrast with townsmen who, 
whether or not they were local merchants, were competitors against the fair-
clientele’.
64 This lack of discrimination in favour of locals arose partly from the fact 
that the four Champagne fair-towns were not great centres of international trade before 
the fairs arose, and thus did not have powerful groups of indigenous merchants 
lobbying for privileges.
65 But it was also caused by the fact that the counts of 
Champagne refrained from granting such privileges even once the fairs began to 
operate as continuous international markets. Bourquelot and Alengry ascribe this 
policy to the general weakness of ‘communal’ privileges in the Champagne region, 
especially compared to neighbouring France.
66 But such weakness was surely 
endogenous, and Chapin probably gets closer to the truth by pointing out that the fairs 
made the counts wealthy, freeing them from the need to sell privileges to the fair-
towns and their elites.
67 For whatever reason, at least under the counts the Champagne 
fairs offered the unique combination of a continuous international trading forum with 
                                                 
60 Bourquelot (1865), I:194. 
61 Arbois de Jubainville and Pigeotte (1859-66), V:221. 
62 Bassermann (1911), 55; Arbois de Jubainville and Pigeotte (1859-66), V:136-7, 143, 169, 171-2, 177, 
221, 260, 458; Evergates (2010), 107, 110, 111, 135, 136, 267. 
63 Alengry (1915), 39. 
64 Alengry (1915), 37. 
65 Terrasse (2005), 30, 110, 136, 232. 
66 Bourquelot (1865), 197-212. 
67 Chapin (1937).   11 
no institutional discrimination for or against any group of merchants – although this 
policy changed under the kings of France, as we shall see shortly. 
 
The ascendancy of the Champagne fairs was thus strongly favoured by the policies of 
the political authorities. The counts of Champagne provide a vivid example of the 
importance of the political authorities in providing the minimal requirements for 
market-based economic activity to flourish. They guaranteed security, property rights 
and contract enforcement, they built infrastructure, they regulated weights and 
measures, they supported foreign merchant lenders against politically powerful 
debtors, and they provided a level playing field between foreign merchants and locals. 
The distinguishing characteristic of all these institutional services was that the counts 
provided them not as particularized privileges granted to specific merchant guilds or 
communities, but rather as generalized institutional guarantees issued ‘to all 
merchants, merchandise, and all manner of persons coming to the fair’.
68 They were 
then maintained and extended by a princely ruler in the interests of protecting ‘his 
fairs’ as a piece of property that delivered a valuable stream of revenues. 
 
3. The Decline of the Fairs and ‘Particularized’ Institutional Provision 
 
If the Champagne fairs enjoyed this fortunate combination of institutional services, 
then why did they ultimately lose their ascendancy over international trade in 
medieval Europe? Examining the decline of the Champagne fairs casts further light on 
the sources of their earlier success.  
 
A first issue relates to the timing of the fairs’ decline. Bautier argued that the fairs 
began to decline as merchandise markets soon after the middle of the thirteenth 
century, while retaining their role as money markets until the early fourteenth 
century.
69 Much conventional wisdom follows this assessment, so it is important to 
examine its empirical basis.
70 Bautier bases his conclusion about the timing of decline 
solely on two documents of 1262 and 1320 which show Italian merchants obtaining 
funds at the Champagne fairs for cloth purchases actually undertaken in Flemish and 
                                                 
68 Alengry (1915), 38. For a detailed discussion of ‘particularized’ and ‘generalized’ institutional 
provision, see Ogilvie (2005). 
69 Bautier (1953), 135-6.  
70 Verlinden (1965), 133; Reyerson (2000), 68; Terrasse (2005), 72, 136.   12 
French textile centres rather than at the fairs. From this he concludes that by 1262 the 
fairs had already begun to decline as merchandise markets.
71 
 
But these Italians’ visits to textile centres in 1262 can only be interpreted as evidence 
of decline if we have evidence that Italian merchants frequenting the fairs had never 
visited textile centres in the pre-1262 period. There is no such evidence: what we 
observe in 1262 may have been standard practice. Furthermore, Bautier’s conclusion 
does not take account of the fact that in 1262 Flemish merchants had decided not to 
visit the fairs because they had been maltreated by the customs collector at Bapaume, 
the toll-station they were legally obliged to pass on their way to Champagne.
72 Italian 
merchants could well have been purchasing cloth directly in Flanders in 1262 in 
response to this temporary Flemish boycott, rather than because the fairs were already 
in decline as merchandise markets.  
 
By contrast, Bautier’s two documents reveal clear differences between 1262 and 1320. 
In 1262, the Italian merchants buying cloth in textile centres were still bringing it to 
the Champagne fairs before shipping it to Italy. This suggests that in the 1260s the 
Italian merchants still treated the fairs as their main base for the cloth trade even when 
they obtained the cloth in other places. In 1320, by contrast, the cloth purchased was 
neither bought at the Champagne fairs nor dispatched from them; only the finance was 
arranged there.
73 If Bautier’s two documents show anything, therefore, it is not that 
decline had already started in 1262, but that it intervened sometime between then and 
1320. 
 
Additional evidence casts doubt on the idea that by the 1260s the merchandising 
operations at the fairs were in decline and only the financial business survived. For 
one thing, this claim would imply that merchants attending the fairs after 1260 were 
specialist financiers with little interest in merchandise trade. But Bassermann shows 
that ‘almost all the Italian firms – with the exception of the Romans – which played a 
decisive role on the money-market [at the Champagne fairs] were also present in the 
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merchandise trade’.
74 Sayous, too, notes that the Italians who frequented the 
Champagne fairs traded in both merchandise and money rather than specializing in 
one or the other.
75 Blomquist reaches a similar conclusion for the Lucchese at the 
fairs.
76 In the absence of specialization in financial business by Italians at the fairs 
between 1260 and 1320, it is difficult to see how the merchandise trade could have 
declined from 1260 onwards while the fairs remained a prosperous international 
financial market. 
 
Notarial documents from Genoa and Marseilles, moreover, reveal a diametrically 
opposite trajectory in the merchandise trade at the Champagne fairs. Doehaerd’s study 
of Genoese notarial registers finds that the merchandise trade between Genoa and the 
fairs shows a marked recrudescence starting around 1250; she concludes that it 
remained lively until at least 1300.
77 Face’s study of notarial documents from Genoa 
and Marseilles shows a ‘truly huge scale participation of the merchants from the 
northern Italian cities in the caravan trade with Champagne throughout the last three 
quarters of the thirteenth century’. He concludes that ‘while it would … be erroneous 
to assume that these Italians played no part in the fair trade prior to the second quarter 
of that century, our evidence does indicate that their activity was much more intensive 
from that time forward’.
78 Notarial archives thus show the merchandise trade to the 
Champagne fairs from Italy and Provence increasing, not decreasing, after c. 1250. 
 
Additional evidence inconsistent with the notion of a declining merchandise trade at 
the fairs after 1260 is provided by the fact that Montpellier, the most important 
Provençal town trading with the fairs, continued to negotiate treaties with seigneurs on 
the Rhone river to clear a path for its merchants to ship merchandise to the 
Champagne fairs, signing a treaty to that effect with the count of Valence and the 
seigneurs of Montelimar in 1265.
79 As late as 1295, Italian merchants requested an 
extension of the period during which Flemish merchants displayed their cloths at the 
                                                 
74 Bassermann (1911), 87-8. 
75 Sayous (1932), 20. 
76 Blomquist (1985), 523. 
77 Doehaerd (1941), 212, 216. 
78 Face (1957), 170. 
79 Alengry (1915), 152.   14 
Champagne fairs, from three to four days; Bassermann interprets this as indicating an 
increased volume of cloth-trade between Flemish and Italian merchants at the fairs.
80 
 
So if the fairs continued to flourish as merchandise and money markets long after the 
1260s, when did they begin to decline? A quantitative indication is provided by 
Bourquelot’s figures on the tax yield of the fairs, shown in Table 1. The only fair for 
which a pre-1275 figure is available, that of Bar-sur-Aube, shows revenues doubling 
between 1212 and the 1270s, slightly declining in the 1280s, recovering to a peak in 
1296, and then falling off sharply from 1298 onwards. The four fairs of Troyes and 
Provins largely mirror this pattern, with healthy revenues in 1275, decline (in Troyes) 
or stagnation (in Provins) in the 1280s, a remarkable highpoint in 1296, and a 
precipitous fall from 1298 on. The combined revenues of all five fairs (excluding 
sparsely documented Lagny) show rising revenues up to 1296, followed by 
catastrophic decline.  
 
Bautier acknowledges that Bourquelot’s figures show 1296 to have been the absolute 
high-point of the fairs, but seeks to cast doubt on their reliability by claiming that they 
include only the direct yield of the fairs, neglecting revenues from sealing fair-debts, 
whose increase, he argues, ‘must have almost compensated for the (possibly desired) 
diminution of the [direct yield]’.
81 But as Lefèvre pointed out, the period between the 
1280s and the 1320s saw a decline in the fairs’ commercial revenues (rentals on halls, 
stalls and hostels, plus seigneurial dues on the fair-trade) and a rise in their 
administrative revenues (forfeits and fines, sealing and default fees); he interprets ‘the 
expensiveness of the seal as a particular index of decadence’ for the fairs.
82 
Furthermore, figures on sealing revenues, assembled in Table 2, show Bautier’s 
arithmetic to be unfounded. Sealing revenues were minor before 1290, and even at 
their peak around 1320 were insufficient to bring total revenues of any fair up to its 
pre-1298 level.  
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Table 1: 
Total Yield of the Taxes Levied at the Champagne Fairs, c. 1275-1341 (in livres tournois) 
 
Date  St Jean 





St Ayoul fair 
in Provins 







Total for five 
fairs
a 
1212  -  -  -  -  -  1000  - 
c. 1275  1300  700  1000
b  800  -  2000  5800 
1285  -  -  -  810  -  1680  - 
1287  800
c  550  925  -  -  -  - 
1288  790  480  -  990  -  -  - 
1296
d  1376  1386
e  1554  1926
f  1814  2141
g  8383 
1298-9  760  620  100  640  -  1200  3320 
c. 1310  300  60  450
h  250  -  700  1760 
1320  250  290  -  218
i  -  -  - 
1323  -  -  -  -  -  705  - 
1340-1  180
j  177
k  155  -
l  360  280
m  1152 
unspecified date before tax 
innovations of 1292-6
n 
800-900  160  1000-1100  800-900  -  1600-1800  4360-4860 
Source: Bourquelot (1867), II: 199 with note 1, except Provins May fair 1320. Lefèvre (1858), 446, reports slightly different figures (see notes).  
 
Notes 
a For 1275, 1296, 1298-9, 1310, and unknown date before tax rise, excluded fair is Lagny; for 1340-1 it is Provins May fair. 
b Lefèvre (1858), 446, reports 1000-1053. 
c Lefèvre (1858), 446, reports 1084. 
d Figures for this year have been rounded to the nearest full livre. 
e Lefèvre (1858), 446, reports 1368. 
f Lefèvre (1858), 446, reports 1225. 
g Lefèvre (1858), 446, reports 1140. 
h Lefèvre (1858), 446, reports 400. 
i Terrasse (2005), 256 n. 407. 
j Lefèvre (1858), 446, reports 517, probably by including sealing-fees. 
k Lefèvre (1858), 446, reports 480, probably by including sealing-fees. 
l Lefèvre (1858), 446, reports 360, as does Alengry (1915), 86. 
m Lefèvre (1858), 446, reports 596, probably by including sealing-fees. 
n Source is document written c. 1310 comparing fair yield in that year with unknown previous period ‘before merchants repairing to the fairs of Champagne heard anyone 
speak of the denier in the livre, or the quarter-denier of brokerage, or the maletouste’. These new taxes were introduced in 1292-6 (see Bourquelot (1865), II: 192-3).  16 
Table 2: 




















1285  -  -  -  -  40  67 
1287  56  63  55  -  -  - 
1288  67  86  66  -  -  - 
1319-20
b  466  16  313  495  -  426 
1340-1  319  290  209  -  -  310 
 




a Figures have been rounded to nearest livre. 
b According to Bourquelot (1865), II: 195, ‘It is in 1320 that the yield is much the highest; I do not 




Bourquelot’s figures on fair revenues thus remain a defensible indicator of economic 
activity at the Champagne fairs, and strongly suggest that decline did not set in until 
the later 1290s. At least one fair (that of Bar-sur-Aube) had a trade volume twice as 
high in the 1275-96 period as in the early thirteenth century, and all the fairs saw 
reasonably stable trade volumes in the 1275-96 period followed by an irreversible 
downturn after 1298. Furthermore, these quantitative findings from the fairs 
themselves are consistent with four other quantitative sources. The first is the analysis 
of Italian and Provençal notarial registers, discussed earlier, showing that the 
merchandise trade to the Champagne fairs increased in the second half of the 
thirteenth century. The second is the yield of the Bapaume toll-station that Flemish 
goods were required to pass on their way to the fairs, which suggest that up to at least 
the early 1290s, ‘the volume of economic value traded from Flanders to France and 
vice versa was growing’, but that from 1297 onward it was characterized by a 
declining trend, sometimes involving complete stoppages which lasted for several 
years, together with rising instability reflected in a growing reluctance by private toll-
farmers to pay to lease the toll-station.
83 The third is the volume of merchandise 
passing the toll-station at Villeneuve near Chillon on Lake Geneva, one of the 
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principal routes for Italian wares coming to the Champagne fairs, which fell from 17.2 
bales per day in 1286 to only 11.6 bales per day for the 1022 days following 30 
November 1294.
84 A final quantitative indication is the hostel-rent paid by German 
merchants to the fair-authorities for the St Remy fair in Troyes, which was 35 livres in 
1285, 70 livres in 1286, but only 10 livres in 1320.
85 
 
The quantitative findings are also consistent with qualitative evidence reflecting a 
contemporary perception in the period 1310-15 that the Champagne fairs had recently 
declined. A document dated c. 1310 points out how severely the tax yield of the 
Champagne fairs had fallen compared to a period before the existence of certain 
named taxes which we know from outside evidence to have been introduced in 1292-
6.
86 In a document dated c. 1315-22, the Champagne fair-wardens and French 
merchants propose reforms that might halt the fairs’ serious decline.
87 Together, these 
various quantitative and qualitative sources support the view that trade at the 
Champagne fairs was rising up to 1296, but underwent a severe decline thereafter. 
 
Why did the Champagne fairs decline? Bautier advances two main explanations. First, 
he argues that gold began to replace silver as the basis of international trade at the end 
of the thirteenth century, causing fluctuations in these metals’ relative value and 
harmful repercussions for money-changing and foreign exchange at the Champagne 
fairs.
88 But as Munro points out, the significant fluctuations in the relative values of 
gold and silver occurred too late to explain the decline of the Champagne fairs. The 
value of gold relative to silver peaked in 1330-2 and then fell sharply as a result of 
sudden increases in Sudanese and Hungarian gold supplies on western European 
markets.
89 Fluctuations in the relative value of gold and silver cannot explain why the 
decline of the fairs had become marked by 1315. 
 
                                                 
84 Own calculations, based on Schulte (1900), 164-5. Lacking disaggregated figures for the 1022 days 
following 30 November 1294, we cannot judge when the worst decline occurred, and thus whether 1297 
was the key date for this southern trade as it was for the trade from Flanders. 
85 Schulte (1900), 165-6. 
86 Bourquelot (1865), II:199 with n. 1. 
87 Bourquelot (1865), II:306; Thomas (1977), 438. 
88 Bautier (1953), 143-4. 
89 Munro (2001), 419.   18 
Bautier’s second explanation for the fairs’ decline is the development of cloth 
production in Italy. Italians had purchased cloth from Flanders and other northwest 
European industrial centres at the Champagne fairs until the end of the thirteenth 
century, Bautier argues, but from the beginning of the fourteenth century Italy itself 
began to produce cloth for export, and Milanese and Florentine cloth producers 
competed successfully with the Flemish, so Italian merchants no longer needed to go 
to the Champagne fairs for cloth.
90 But as Munro points out, the key changes in Italian 
textile production date only from the 1320s, too late to explain a decline of the 
Champagne fairs by 1315, let alone by Bautier’s favoured date of 1260.
91  
 
Why, then, were the Champagne fairs still flourishing as markets for merchandise and 
finance as late as the mid-1290s but in serious decline by c. 1315? The answer resides 
in a reversal of the very factors that had favoured the fairs’ ascendancy in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries – the policies pursued by the public authorities. Until 1285, 
Champagne was ruled by the counts of Champagne who, although formally vassals of 
France, in practice administered the county internally with virtual autonomy.
92 In 
1274, the last count died and his minor daughter was betrothed to the son of the 
French king, whose majority in 1285 saw the annexation of Champagne to France.
93 
The new French King, Philip IV, was ambitious to centralize the French monarchy and 
expand its military and fiscal capacities. The tactics he used – war with Flanders, 
despoiling and excluding Flemish merchants, arresting and taxing Italian merchants, 
and barring exports of raw wool and undyed cloth from France – all affected trade at 
the Champagne fairs within 15 years of their coming under French governance. 
Conflicts between France and Flanders restricted the ability of Flemish merchants to 
attend the fairs, confiscatory taxation and incarceration encumbered and deterred 
Italian merchants from operating in France, and prohibitions on the export of wool and 
woollen cloth reduced the attractiveness of the fairs to all. 
 
Bautier recognized that the Franco-Flemish conflicts at the end of the thirteenth 
century damaged the Champagne fairs, but gave two reasons for concluding that they 
were not the main cause of the fairs’ decline. One was his claim that the fairs had 
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begun to decline as a market for international trade in merchandise from 1260, so the 
restrictions on Flemish cloth-merchants’ ability to attend the fairs from 1297 onwards 
cannot have played a major role in the business of the fairs.
94 But, as we have shown, 
Bautier’s premise that trade in merchandise began to decline from 1260 cannot be 
sustained: the merchandise trade at the Champagne fairs continued to thrive until at 
least the 1290s.  
 
Bautier’s second reason to reject the role of the war is his contention that as early as 
1294 Flemish cloth comprised only 20 per cent of the value of cloth sold at the fairs, 
and hence restrictions on Flemish merchants cannot have had a major impact.
95 The 
figure of 20 per cent comes from Bautier’s analysis of cloth purchased at the fairs by a 
single Sienese company in 1294.
96 Closer analysis of this document, however, reveals 
Bautier’s calculations to be misleading. Bautier excludes cloth from Douai, Lille and 
Orchies, but in 1294 these three towns were Flemish, not French: they were 
surrendered to France in 1305 by the Treaty of Athis-sur-Orge which ended the 
Franco-Flemish war of 1302-05. Hence cloth purchased from these three towns must 
be included when calculating the proportion originating from Flanders in 1294. This 
recalculation shows that Flemish cloth comprised 40 per cent of the value of cloth 
purchased at the Champagne fairs by this Sienese firm in 1294. The exclusion from 
the fairs at various points from 1297 onwards of a group of merchants that provided 
two-fifths of the value of cloth sold in 1294 must have had a major adverse impact on 
the attractiveness of the fairs to other merchants.  
 
The only two reasons for rejecting the Franco-Flemish conflicts as a cause of the fairs’ 
decline are thus not convincing. By contrast, the positive evidence in favour of this 
thesis is striking. The conflicts between France and Flanders began in 1297 as a 
consequence of an alliance between Flanders and England against France, and almost 
immediately had a direct impact on the Champagne fairs. On 2 January 1297, at the 
opening of the Lagny fair (the first in the annual Champagne cycle), French royal 
officials arrested all Flemish merchants, confiscated their goods, and sold the 
merchandise to profit the royal exchequer. Although Flemish merchants 
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understandably stayed away from the five ensuing Champagne fairs of 1297, the 
French crown confiscated all the wares Flemish merchants had contracted to buy at 
those fairs, all letters of credit payable to Flemish merchants, and even the halls and 
hostels owned by Flemish merchants in the fair-towns. The resulting losses of the 
Flemish town of Ypres in that year alone were estimated at over 26,000 livres. 
Flemish merchants who were unable to make promised payments at the fairs because 
their goods had been confiscated were then penalized with a fair-ban, prohibiting them 
from visiting the fairs until they paid their debts. Flemish merchandise was also seized 
in other parts of France.
97 Laurent describes 1297 as ‘the black year of Franco-Flemish 
commercial relations … [which] announced all the vicissitudes of the ensuing 
century’.
98 This is strikingly consistent with the figures in Table 1, which show the 
fair-revenues declining precipitously after 1296. 
 
France invaded Flanders in 1297, and in October 1297 a truce was arranged, which 
permitted normal commercial relations to resume, but only very briefly. Philip IV of 
France wished to assert his rights as sovereign lord of Flanders, so when the truce 
expired in January 1300, a French army overran the part of Flanders that had remained 
under the control of the count of Flanders. This occupation led to the Flemish revolt of 
1302 and the Franco-Flemish war of 1302-5, which again severely interrupted Franco-
Flemish trade.
99 This war was ended by the Treaty of Athis-sur-Orge in which, among 
other provisions, Flanders was returned to the count of Flanders in exchange for 
Béthune, Douai, Lille and Orchies being held by Philip IV until the count paid a large 
annual rent for the county of Rethel. But the terms of this treaty could not be enforced, 
and by the Treaty of Pontoise in 1312 the towns held by France were ceded to it 
altogether, in exchange for cancellation of the rent owed by the count of Flanders for 
Rethel. France thus acquired two great Flemish towns and most of French-speaking 
Flanders. Grievances remained, however, and fighting broke out again in 1314. In 
1315 the new King of France, Louis X, again expelled all Flemings from France and 
assembled an army against Flanders. The consequence of the various Franco-Flemish 
conflicts from 1297 to 1315 for Flemish trade at the Champagne fairs is described by 
Laurent as follows: ‘by 1315 Flanders was cut into two … instead of being the avenue 
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that led to the Champagne fairs, French-speaking Flanders was henceforth the barrier 
which prevented access to them.’
100  
 
The attractiveness of the Champagne fairs to their other major clientele, the Italian 
merchants, was also gradually diminished by French royal policy. In 1274 and 1277, 
before Champagne became part of France, the French king had arrested all ‘Lombard’ 
(north Italian) merchants trading in France and only released them after extorting 
heavy tax-payments.
101 By 1291, when the French king again deployed this fiscal 
tactic, Champagne had become part of France so that Italian merchants trading at the 
Champagne fairs were directly affected.
102 The French authorities only freed Italian 
merchants and permitted them to continue trading in France (including Champagne) 
when they agreed to pay large sums to the royal exchequer as a sort of ransom.
103 One 
Italian victim of this arbitrary royal attack wrote in 1291 to a correspondent in 
England, ‘We have been and we are strongly tormented when we think of the difficult 
situation and damage which can result from this event for our merchandise, our 
capital, and what we possess in Flanders and in Champagne.’
104 It seems likely that 
these adverse policy shifts on the part of the French crown lay behind Lombard 
merchants’ 1295 offer of money to the count of Flanders in return for permission to 
establish headquarters in Ghent and conduct wholesale commerce in Flanders, shifting 
their trade away from the Champagne fairs.
105 Over the years after the 1291 arrests – 
in 1292, 1295, 1297, 1303, and 1311 – Italian merchants were repeatedly obliged to 
make substantial payments to the French crown as the price of being allowed to 
continue trading in French territory.
106  
 
Italian merchants’ incentives to avoid French territory intensified from 1303 onwards, 
when Philip IV imposed a prohibition on the export of wool and cloth from France. 
Since the twelfth century, merchants from Florence and other Italian towns had bought 
raw wool and unfinished cloth in France, to be finished in Florence and then re-
exported. This competition from the Florentine wool-finishing industry led to pressure 
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from French producers to ban the export of raw wool, unfinished woollen cloth, and 
even the raw materials for dyeing, culminating in the royal export prohibition in 1303, 
which remained in force until 1360, apart from the single year of 1315.
107 In the early 
fourteenth century, therefore, the policies of the French state not only restricted the 
supply of Flemish cloth to the fairs but also prevented the Italian demand for raw wool 
and cloths at the fairs from being met. Since the cloth trade was a central component 
of economic activity at the Champagne fairs, these restrictions severely affected the 
prosperity of the fairs, and thus explain why they were in serious decline by 1315. 
 
The decline of the Champagne fairs that had set in by 1310-15 resulted, as noted 
above, in a set of proposals for reform presented to the king of France around 1315-22, 
and from then on the French crown enacted repeated ordinances in attempts to revive 
the fairs.
108 But these policies failed, not least because they continued to mandate 
export restrictions on wool, a key component of the fairs’ trade during their 
ascendancy. If the Italians could not obtain the indispensable English wool at the 
Champagne fairs, they would go elsewhere for it – to Flanders or to England itself – 
and that is what they did.
109 The last important group of Italian merchants left the fairs 
in 1350, after which the Champagne fairs retained only regional significance.
110  
 
A further reason the decline of the fairs that had begun by 1315 proved to be 
irreversible was, in Munro’s graphic phrase, the ‘spreading stain’ of warfare in Europe 
which greatly increased the costs of overland trade.
111 The resumption of the Guelph-
Ghibelline wars in Italy from 1313 to 1343 greatly increased risks on the overland 
route from Genoa to the Champagne fairs, as shown by the declaration of a non-
Genoese Italian merchant before a Genoese notary in 1327 explaining why he had 
been compelled to remain for so long in the city.
112 Civil war broke out in Flanders 
between 1323 and 1328, and the Hundred Years War (a civil war over the French 
throne) began in 1337. These military events meant that European overland trade 
contracted dramatically during the fourteenth century. The final demise of the 
Champagne fairs in the mid-fourteenth century cannot, therefore, be attributed wholly 
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to foreign military ventures and domestic protectionism on the part of the French royal 
government. But this does not alter the fact that the fairs’ initial decline around 1300 
was due to decisions by the French crown which hampered or altogether prevented 
participation in the fairs by both major components of its clientele – the Flemish and 
the Italians – and that none of the regulations subsequently introduced by the French 
state removed this fundamental obstacle to the fairs’ recovery.  
 
The reasons for the decline of the Champagne fairs from the late thirteenth century 
onwards are thus the obverse of the reasons for its preceding success. The French 
regime that took over the fairs after 1285 ceased, bit by bit, to provide the generalized 
institutional mechanisms that had attracted and sustained international trade. Security 
of property rights, contract enforcement, and access to commercial infrastructure were 
no longer guaranteed as generalized institutional services but rather became 
particularized ‘privileges’ offered (and denied) in order to serve the short-term 
interests of French royal policy. The public authorities no longer offered a level 
playing-field to all merchants – domestic or foreign, allied or non-allied – but rather 
granted privileges that favoured particular interest-groups and discriminated against 
others. International trade at the Champagne fairs fell victim to this shift from 
generalized to particularized institutional provision. 
 
4. The Champagne Fairs and Private-Order Contract Enforcement 
 
What implications do these findings have for the lessons some economists have drawn 
from the Champagne fairs concerning the institutional basis for impersonal exchange 
and market-based economic development? The most influential economic precept 
derived from the fairs is the idea, advanced in 1990 by Milgrom, North and Weingast, 
that private-order contract enforcement is sufficient to support international trade and 
that a public legal system is not required. Milgrom, North and Weingast argue that the 
Champagne fairs fostered international trade through private-order courts in which 
private judges kept records of traders’ behaviour. Before agreeing any deal, merchants 
would ask a private judge about the reputation of their potential trading partner. By 
communicating reputational status of traders on demand, the private judges enabled 
merchants to boycott those who had previously defaulted on contracts. The private 
judges also are also supposed to have levied fines for misconduct, which merchants   24 
voluntarily paid because non-payment meant losing all future trade at the Champagne 
fairs. This combination of private judges and individual merchants’ reputations created 
incentives for all merchants to fulfill contractual obligations, it is argued, even though 
state enforcement was absent and repeated interactions between trading partners were 
rare. From this portrayal of the Champagne fairs, Milgrom, North and Weingast 
conclude that international trade expanded in medieval Europe through merchants 
developing ‘their own private code of laws’, employing private judges to apply these 
laws, and deploying private-order sanctions against offenders – all ‘without the benefit 
of state enforcement of contracts’.
113  
 
This view of the Champagne fairs is widely accepted by economists, sociologists, 
legal theorists, and policy-makers, and is used to underpin far-reaching conclusions 
about the institutional basis for exchange in modern economies. Dixit instances private 
judges providing enforcement to merchant ‘customers’ at the Champagne fairs as an 
example of a well-functioning ‘private government’.
114 Davidson and Weersink use 
the Champagne fairs to specify the conditions necessary for markets to function in 
developing economies without adequate state enforcement.
115 Swedberg places this 
portrayal of private courts at the centre of his view of medieval merchant law as 
‘laying the legal foundations for modern capitalism’.
116 Richman agues that private 
judges at the Champagne fairs show how ‘coordination among a merchant community 
can support multilateral exchange without relying on state-sponsored courts’.
117 The 
central role played by the Champagne fairs in social scientists’ understanding of 
contract enforcement in modern economies makes it important to be sure that it is 
accurate.  
 
The argument advanced by Milgrom, North and Weingast depends crucially on the 
absence of public contract enforcement. If the Champagne fairs had possessed public 
authorities capable of penalizing defaulting merchants, then to deter opportunism 
merchants would not have needed to incur the costs of imposing collective boycotts or 
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transmitting information about the past behaviour of other merchants. Did the 
Champagne fairs indeed lack public authorities and legal contract enforcement?  
 
The answer is no. As we have seen, the ascendancy of the Champagne fairs as the 
major fulcrum of international trade in thirteenth-century Europe was sustained by a 
comprehensive system of public contract-enforcement. The counts of Champagne 
provided a state legal system which secured property rights and commercial contracts 
for visiting merchants at multiple levels. Its incentive to provide good services to 
visiting merchants was enhanced by the competition offered by two other components 
of the public legal system – the municipal courts of the fair-towns and the 
ecclesiastical tribunals of local religious houses. In addition, the counts of Champagne 
set up special public tribunals at the fairs in which contracts could be judged and 
enforced by princely fair-wardens. 
 
The fair-wardens, counter to their description by Milgrom, North and Weingast as 
‘private judges’, were officials appointed by the counts of Champagne (after 1285 by 
the kings of France), and their jurisdiction derived from that princely jurisdiction.
118 
The fair-wardens’ courts were also part of the princely legal system by virtue of 
litigants’ right to appeal against their judgments to higher state courts – the Jours de 
Troyes and, after 1285, the Parlement de Paris.
119 In 1287, for instance, several 
burghers of Châlons-sur-Marne appealed to the Parlement de Paris against a seizure of 
cloths mandated by the Champagne fair-wardens.
120 In 1296, the city of Milan 
appealed to the Parlement de Paris against a fair-ban imposed by the wardens.
121 In 
1306, a Genoese merchant appealed to the Parlement de Paris against a decision of the 
fair-wardens dismissing his demand for payment from another Italian merchant.
122 In 
1310, a merchant sentenced by the Champagne fair-wardens to pay a fair-debt 
appealed first to the Jours de Troyes and when that failed to the Parlement de Paris.
123 
The fair-wardens’ courts were thus fully integrated into the princely legal system. 
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Municipal courts in the Champagne fair-towns provided a second set of tribunals for 
merchants at the fairs. These town courts were integrated into the public legal system 
in multiple ways, since they were based on devolved jurisdictional rights granted by 
the prince, their judges often also held princely office, and litigants were entitled to 
appeal to princely courts. Town courts evidently offered an attractive alternative to the 
prince court system since, as we have seen, foreign merchants visiting the fairs 
voluntarily used them, arousing jurisdictional rivalry between the communes and 
princely prévots.  
 
Municipal jurisdictions outside Champagne also contributed to enforcing fair-
contracts, since foreign merchants brought disputes to the courts of their own and their 
debtors’ home cities. In 1230, for instance, a conflict over a debt incurred by Cambrai 
merchants with Bologna merchants at the Provins fair in 1213 was resolved before the 
local court of the archbishop of Cambrai, advised by municipal councillors attesting to 
the authenticity of the seal on the contract.
124 In 1279, a conflict over an unpaid fair-
debt between Florentine and Piacenzan merchants was referred to ‘the Potestà, 
Captain, and council of the commune of Florence’.
125 In 1292 a group of Florentine 
merchants enforced payment of a fair-debt from a Venetian merchant in 1291 by 
mobilizing their own municipal jurisdiction to put pressure on the Venetian city-
court.
126 In 1294, the French king guaranteed Flemish merchants of the ‘Seventeen 
Towns’ frequenting the fairs the right to appeal to their own municipal jurisdictions.
127 
In 1312, a Bolognese merchant pursued a fair-debt from a Florentine creditor through 
his own municipal jurisdiction and then the town court of Florence.
128 Revealed 
preference suggests that Italian and Flemish merchants regarded municipal 
jurisdictions, both in the fair-towns and in each other’s home towns, as an effective 
way of enforcing international trading contracts. 
 
The church offered a further source of public contract enforcement to merchants at the 
Champagne fairs. The fair-tribunals operated by local religious houses were integrated 
into the public legal system, through their basis in jurisdictional rights granted in 
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princely charters and their manning partly by princely officials. Ecclesiastical tribunals 
also offered contract-enforcement to foreign merchants visiting the Champagne fairs 
in a wider, European forum. In principle, the medieval church exercised a jurisdiction 
which transcended territorial and linguistic frontiers, was recognized by temporal 
authorities throughout Christendom, and disposed of enviable moral suasion and a far-
flung network of personnel. Ecclesiastical jurisdictions were thus in a position to 
compete effectively with princely and municipal tribunals in enforcing international 
trading contracts. Until the 1270s, according to Bautier, merchants visiting the 
Champagne fairs were more likely to have commercial contracts sealed in church 
tribunals than by the fair-wardens.
129 This meant that any ensuing dispute over that 
contract would be referred to a church court. Appeals against the decision of a church 
court were referred to the Pope, who would delegate final judgment to an important 
cleric in Champagne, such as the dean of Bar or the prior of Saint-Ayoul in Provins. 
The requirement to settle a fair-debt was usually accompanied by a sentence of papal 
interdict or excommunication in the event of further default.
130 The princely legal 
system itself recognized the importance of ecclesiastical jurisdictions in providing 
contract enforcement to long-distance merchants, as shown by the demands sent 
abroad by the Champagne fair-wardens pursuing defaulting debtors, which were 




The Champagne fairs thus clearly possessed public authorities with the willingness 
and capacity to provide contract-enforcement to international merchants, not only by 
witnessing and sealing commercial agreements but by adjudicating conflicts and 
enforcing compliance. This is not to deny any role for informal, reputation-based 
contract-enforcement mechanisms. Informal mechanisms are ubiquitous in all 
economies, and it is unlikely that they were absent from the Champagne fairs. But 
there were no private judges. Public courts with coercive powers were omnipresent at 
the Champagne fairs and played an important role in contract enforcement among 
merchants. The view that long-distance trade expanded in medieval Europe based 
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solely on reputational mechanisms and private judges receives no support from the 
institutional arrangements at the Champagne fairs. 
 
5. The Champagne Fairs and the ‘Community Responsibility System’ 
 
The medieval Champagne fairs have also been mobilized in support of a second lesson 
for developing economies – the idea, advanced by Greif, that collective reprisals 
between corporative groups of businessmen can support impersonal exchange.
132 In 
this portrayal, courts with coercive powers did exist in medieval Europe, but were 
controlled by local interests which prevented them from protecting foreign merchants’ 
property rights or enforcing contracts impartially. According to Greif, the ‘community 
responsibility system’ stepped into the breach by providing incentives for local courts 
to supply impartial justice. If a member of one community defaulted on a contract with 
a member of another, and the defaulter’s local court did not provide compensation, the 
injured party’s local court would impose collective reprisals on all members of the 
defaulter’s community, incarcerating them and seizing their property to secure 
compensation. The defaulter’s community could only avoid such sanctions by ceasing 
to trade with the injured party’s community. If this prospect was too costly, the 
defaulter’s community had an incentive to provide impartial justice.
  
 
Greif claims that this combination of corporative justice and collective reprisals 
provided the institutional basis for international exchange in the early centuries of the 
Commercial Revolution, and that the Champagne fairs provide a prime example of the 
‘community responsibility system’ in operation. He makes two main arguments 
concerning this second claim. The first is that the Champagne fairs did not have a 
legal system with jurisdiction over visiting merchants. The fair authorities, he claims, 
‘relinquished legal rights over the merchants once they were there. An individual was 
subject to the laws of his community – represented by a consul – not the laws of the 
locality in which a fair was held.’
133 His second argument is that the fair-wardens 
enforced merchant contracts by excluding defaulting debtors and all their compatriots 
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from the fairs.
134 This threat of collective reprisals, he argues, made merchants’ 
communal courts force defaulters to fulfill their contracts.  
 
But is it true that the Champagne fair authorities relinquished legal rights over visiting 
merchants and permitted them to be subject solely to the laws of their own 
communities?
135 It is not. Merchants from a wide array of different European cities 
and territories were frequenting the Champagne fairs by the 1180s at latest, as we have 
seen. For the ensuing sixty years or more, all visiting merchants were subject to the 
public legal system – princely, municipal, and ecclesiastical – prevailing at the fairs. It 
was not until 1245 that the count of Champagne issued a charter stating that 
those Roman, Tuscan, Lombard and Provençal merchants who would like to 
dwell in his [the count’s] house in the lower town of Provins at the St Ayoul 
fairs are granted all liberty for their persons and goods, such that no-one may 
lay hand on any of them, unless in such a fashion as is entailed by law and the 
customs of the fairs, and except for the payment of regular dues on buying and 
selling; he [the count] dispenses them from responding, outside the compound 
of the house, to the fair-wardens and to the bailli, submitting them uniquely to 
his own justice or, in case of his absence, to the governor charged with 
replacing him.
136 
The count thus exempted this subset of visiting merchants from judgment by his bailli 
and fair-wardens, but only by bringing them under his direct jurisdiction. He neither 
relinquished legal rights over them nor subjected them to the laws of their own 
communities. 
  
Around the same time, particular groups of Italian and Provençal merchants 
frequenting the fairs began to appoint consuls, some of whom later came to exercise 
jurisdiction over disputes between members of that particular group of merchants. The 
first reference to any foreign merchant consul at the Champagne fairs was for the 
Sienese in 1246.
137 Consuls for another fifteen Italian cities whose merchants 
frequented the Champagne fairs were mentioned in the course of the second half of the 
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thirteenth century.
138 From 1278 dates the first reference to a ‘universitas’ (joint 
association) of merchants from a number of different Italian cities frequenting the 
fairs.
139 The year 1245 also saw the first reference to a consul from Montpellier, who 
initially had jurisdiction only over merchants from that city. A document of 1258 
indicates that the Montpellier consul was extending his jurisdiction to merchants from 
other Provençal towns trading at the Champagne fairs, and one from 1290 provides a 
list of Provençal towns whose members formed a ‘universitas’ under a ‘capitaneus’ 
(captain) who exercised jurisdiction over them.
140 From 1258, there is also a lone 
reference to an organization of Aragonese merchants frequenting the fairs, although no 
evidence that it exercised jurisdiction.
141  
 
Merchants from other European cities and territories, by contrast, did not have 
consular organizations at the Champagne fairs.
142 The Flemish urban federation 
known as the ‘Seventeen Towns’, mentioned in a handful of documents relating to the 
Champagne fairs, is a shadowy organization whose membership and activities are 
largely unknown, but scholars agree that it was very loosely organized, lacking 
elections, officials, or leadership at the fairs.
143 German merchants frequented the fairs 
in the second half of the thirteenth century, but were not recognized as a community 
until 1294, and even then with no jurisdiction.
144 The most detailed study of the 
nationalities frequenting the fairs lists merchants from many parts of France (until 
1285 territorially distinct from Champagne), Flanders, Brabant, Hainaut, Germany, 




In summary, only a minority of merchants at the fairs – the Italians and the Provençals 
– ever appointed consuls, and these did so only after 1245, sixty years after they had 
begun to trade at the fairs. Among those consuls, only some enjoyed jurisdictional 
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powers immediately; others developed them only gradually or not at all. Those 
consular jurisdictions that did exist at the fairs could only be used to resolve conflicts 
within a particular community, not between members and outsiders. Even then, having 
a consul at the fairs did not exempt merchants from the jurisdiction of the count of 
Champagne or, after 1285, the king of France. Most importantly, the majority of 
merchants – including key groups such as the Flemish – never had their own 
community jurisdictions at the Champagne fairs.  
 
What about the second argument, that contract enforcement at the Champagne fairs 
was supported by community-based collective reprisals? It is true that after 1260 the 
princely fair-wardens used a procedure against defaulting debtors that could culminate 
in collective reprisals. If a debt incurred at a fair was not repaid at the agreed time, the 
debtor was prosecuted in one of the various public courts available at the fairs 
provided he was still in Champagne. If he had left Champagne, his creditor could ask 
the princely fair-wardens to write to the authorities in the town where he was currently 
located, asking them to compel payment by either seizing his goods or sending him 
back to appear before the wardens. If the foreign authorities did not comply, the fair-
wardens could be asked to send further letters reiterating the request. After at least 
three letters, the fair-wardens could threaten the foreign authorities with a fair-ban 
excluding its merchants from future fairs and declaring their goods and bodies forfeit 
to repay the debt. Even at this stage, the foreign authorities could delay the ban by 
appearing before the fair-wardens and explaining why they could not enforce 
repayment. The foreign authorities could also appeal to higher courts – the Jours de 
Troyes or the Parlement of Paris – against any fair-ban.
146 
  
But these collective reprisals were not community-based. They were part of the 
formal, public legal system. Merchant communities at the Champagne fairs played no 
role in requesting or imposing fair-bans. Most merchants were not even subject to 
community pressure at the fairs, since as already discussed consular jurisdictions at the 
fairs arose only after 1245, and even then only for a few groups of merchants. Even in 
merchants’ home cities, the town government rather than the merchant guild was seen 
as the relevant authority for enforcing contracts: in 1294, for example, when the 
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Champagne fair-sergeants delivered a request for prosecution of a defaulting Sienese 
merchant to the guild consuls in Siena, ‘the consuls immediately returned it to the 
sergeant, telling him to carry it to the Podestà [chief town magistrate] because, they 
said, he was greater and had more power’.
147 A merchant trading at the fairs 
sometimes asked his own political authorities back home to impose a collective 
reprisal, but this involved penalties on his debtor’s compatriots in the home polity of 
the creditor, not at the Champagne fairs.
148 Community-based reprisals at the fairs 
themselves were specifically outlawed, since one of the security guarantees the counts 
of Champagne granted to merchants attending the fairs was freedom from all reprisals 
except for those initiated by the fair-wardens as comital officials.  
 
Far from being based on community jurisdiction, collective reprisals at the fairs were 
based on princely jurisdiction and were thoroughly embedded in public legal 
procedures. A fair-ban could only be imposed by the public authorities of Champagne 
– i.e., by the princely fair-wardens, supported on appeal by the Jours de Troyes and 
after 1285 by the Parlement de Paris. Contrary to the claim that the Champagne fair 
authorities relinquished legal rights over merchants attending the fairs, the princely 
fair-wardens explicitly claimed that they had authority over fair-debtors even when 
such merchants had left Champagne, claiming in a letter of 1295, for example, that 
‘these customs [of the fairs] supersede all other customs of all territories’.
149 The 
elaborate legal procedures which had to be followed before a fair-ban could even be 
threatened indicate both how deeply the reprisal system was embedded in the formal 
legal system, and how reluctant the Champagne authorities were actually to impose it, 




When a fair-ban was declared, it was imposed not on the merchants of a debtor’s 
community, but rather on the merchants subject to a justice-system which had failed to 
enforce a fair-debt. This is nicely illustrated by a case of 1299-1300, in which the 
Champagne fair-wardens requested the lord mayor of London to arrest a Florentine 
merchant for a debt of 1,600 livres tournois owed at the Champagne fairs to a 
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merchant of Prato. When the London mayor replied that he had heard the Florentine 
merchant’s account and concluded that no debt was owed, the fair-wardens responded 
by threatening a fair-ban, not against merchants of Florence as the ‘community’ of 
which the debtor was indisputably a member, but rather against merchants of London, 
as the justice-system which had refused to render legal remedy for a fair-debt.
151 
 
The effectiveness of the Champagne fair-ban in enforcing contracts should not be 
overstated. Foreign jurisdictions were often reluctant to comply with the Champagne 
fair-wardens’ demands. Some jurisdictions adumbrated reasons why compliance was 
impossible, claiming that it required an order from a higher authority (as in Malines in 
1277
152 or Florence in 1279
153), or that the debtor had left town (as in Venice in 
1299).
154 Others moved agonizingly slowly, with the London authorities putting the 
fair-wardens off for seven years between 1293 and 1300
155 and the Florentine 
authorities delaying them for four years between 1294 and 1298.
156 Some refused to to 
recognize the fair-wardens’ competence, as in 1277 when the Parlement de Paris 
imprisoned the Champagne fair-wardens for exceeding their authority in demanding 
that the bailli of Vermandois appear in their court.
157 Flat refusals were not unknown, 
as in 1296-8 when the Florentine authorities told the fair wardens that they were too 
busy to concern themselves with an unpaid fair-debt.
158 Even when fair-bans were 
imposed, they could be avoided, as in 1264 when Cahors merchants attended the 
Champagne fairs despite a preceding fair-ban,
159 in 1297 when the captain of the 
universitas of Italian merchants frequenting the Champagne fairs mediated an 
agreement between creditors from Ypres and the Ricciardi firm of Lucca allowing the 
latter to attend the fairs despite the existence of a fair-ban against Lucca,
160 or in 1302 
when the bishop of Paris paid a modest sum to various Piacenzan firms to annul a fair-
ban requested against his subjects.
161 On the other hand, creditor merchants would not 
have paid the fair-wardens to undertake the elaborate documentary stages on the way 
                                                 
151 Huvelin (1897), 430-1; Bassermann (1911), 46. 
152 Bautier (1953), 125. 
153 Berti (1857), 247. 
154 Laurent (1935), 300. 
155 Walford (1883), 250-9. 
156 Berti (1857), 256-7, 264-7. 
157 Boutaric (1867), I:193 (#2097); Laurent (1935), 281. 
158 Berti (1857), 260-1, 267-70. 
159 Bautier (1953), 124. 
160 Laurent (1935), 297. 
161 Laurent (1935), 297-8.   34 
to imposing a fair-ban had they not held some expectation of success. Hence it is 
reasonable to view the fair-ban procedure as having made some contribution to the 
ability of the Champagne fair-wardens to enforce merchant contracts, despite its 
recognized limitations. 
 
But collective reprisals cannot have been the crucial contract-enforcement mechanism 
underlying the ascendancy of the Champagne fairs, since there is no evidence that fair-
bans were used to enforce merchant contracts in the period 1180-1260. There are only 
two mentions of fair-bans from the period before 1260: one in 1221 where the creditor 
was a sovereign prince and thus extraordinary ‘diplomatic’ guarantees were needed; 
and the other in 1242-3, which was to penalize violation of a safe conduct rather than a 
commercial contract.
162 The Champagne fairs thus flourished as the undisputed 
fulcrum of European international trade for eighty years, between c. 1180 and c. 1260, 
without using collective reprisals to enforce contracts.  
 
This raises the question of what mechanism operated before 1260 to prevent fair-
debtors from defaulting? A possible answer is that the Champagne fairs, as the most 
important international market in Europe, were the source of profitable trading 
opportunities that could not be replicated elsewhere. As we have seen, the fairs offered 
princely, municipal, and ecclesiastical courts with powers to compel merchants to 
fulfill contractual obligations while they were in Champagne. The only way a 
defaulting debtor could avoid prosecution was to avoid the fairs permanently, losing 
profitable trading opportunities. Provided that the benefit of absconding was lower 
than the cost of sacrificing future trading opportunities at the fairs, a merchant had an 
incentive to pay his debts. If this condition was met for the majority of merchants, then 
the combination of profitable trading opportunities and an effective legal system with 
coercive powers provides an explanation for why merchants at the Champagne fairs 
typically paid their debts rather than defaulting. The use of the fair-ban procedure 
against absconding debtors after 1260 may have provided an additional deterrent 
against default, but cannot have constituted the main reason why debts were typically 
paid. The Champagne fair-bans thus do not support the view that corporative contract 
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enforcement played a central role in the growth of international trade during the 




The medieval Champagne fairs do hold lessons for the institutional foundations of 
impersonal exchange and long-distance trade, but not those for which they have often 
been mobilized. For one thing, they provide no support for the view that international 
trade developed on the basis of private-order legal provision. There were no ‘private 
judges’ at the Champagne fairs. Rather, the Champagne fairs offered an effective 
combination of state, ecclesiastical, and municipal courts, among which foreign 
merchants could (and did) shop around. This system was supplemented by a dedicated 
fair court, but its judges, the fair-wardens, were also princely officials and did not 
prevent foreign merchants from enforcing contracts at other levels of the princely 
justice-system, in front of courts operated by local abbeys, and in municipal courts. 
 
Nor do the Champagne fairs support the idea that long-distance trade could develop on 
the basis of contract enforcement offered by collective reprisals among corporative 
communities of businessmen, in the absence of impartial public contract-enforcement. 
The role of merchant ‘communities’ at the Champagne fairs was minimal. No 
merchants had them for the first 60 years of the fairs; many important groups of 
merchants at the fairs never had them at all; and even the few groups that did have 
them in later phases of the fairs’ existence could only use them for internal contract 
enforcement and relied on the public legal system to enforce contracts between 
merchants of different communities. Collective reprisals were used in a limited way in 
the final phase of the fairs’ ascendancy, after c. 1260, but they were fully integrated 
into the formal legal system, their enforcement relied on state coercion, and the few 
merchant ‘communities’ at the fairs played no role in initiating or implementing them. 
 
What the Champagne fairs do show is that the policies and actions undertaken by the 
public authorities were crucial to impersonal exchange and international trade in 
medieval Europe. Between the 1180s and the 1290s, the rulers of Champagne 
provided security and contract enforcement to all merchants regardless of community 
affiliation: long-distance trade flourished and the Champagne fairs became the fulcrum   36 
of European trade. From the late 1290s, as the French crown ceased to provide 
generalized security and contract enforcement at the fairs, and instead began to tax and 
constrain particular groups of merchants to serve its fiscal, military and political ends, 
long-distance trade deserted Champagne and moved to centres such as Bruges where 
public goods were more impartially provided. The Champagne fairs succeeded 
because the public authorities provided generalized institutional services open to all 
traders; they declined when the regime switched to particularized institutional 
provision which discriminated in favour of (and against) specific groups of merchants.   37 
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